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OPINION OF THE COURT
                        
This appeal comes to us from an order of the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissing an action brought by Guthrie Clinic, Ltd.
(“Guthrie”), a Pennsylvania entity, against several entities purportedly responsible for
providing Guthrie with excess liability insurance coverage for certain years.  In
particular, Guthrie alleges that renewal insurance policies it retained for 1998 and 1999
were, contrary to its expectations, materially different from its previous insurance
policies.  Because of the resulting gaps in coverage, Guthrie alleges that it suffered losses
which it urges it had reasonably assumed were covered.  Guthrie filed a diversity suit in
federal court against the insurance carrier for the 1998 and 1999 policies, Travelers
3Indemnity Company of Illinois (“Travelers”), and certain entities that brokered the
relevant insurance policies.  Upon a motion filed by Travelers, the District Court
concluded that Guthrie had failed to join the particular insurance broker, a Pennsylvania
entity that it alleged had been instrumental in securing Guthrie’s 1999 renewal policy. 
Having determined that broker to be a necessary and indispensable party pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 19, the District Court dismissed the action because the joinder of a non-diverse
party would destroy its subject matter jurisdiction.  We have jurisdiction over the District
Court’s final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We will affirm.
I.
Guthrie purchased a $5 million excess insurance policy from Travelers covering
the period between September 1, 1996 and September 1, 1997 (the “1996 policy”).  An
excess insurance policy provides secondary insurance after the primary insurers’
coverage, here $1.2 million, has been exhausted.  Travelers issued a renewal policy
identical to the 1996 policy in 1997.  The 1998 renewal policy was, by contrast,
materially different.  The changes allegedly included a new definition of covered claims 
and modified notification procedures.  Guthrie alleges that because these changes to the
insurance policy were made unilaterally and without any notice, it was under the belief
that the coverage was identical to the 1996 and 1997 policies.  In August of 1999,
Guthrie signed a 1999 renewal policy that was identical to the 1998 renewal policy in all
material respects, again assuming the provisions mirrored those of the 1996 and 1997
    1For the sake of convenience, we will retain the abbreviations used by the District
Court.  
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policies.
In June of 1998, Ellen Thurston filed a medical malpractice claim against various
defendants including Guthrie.  Aware that the suit was likely to reach the limits of its
primary coverage and implicate its excess liability coverage, Guthrie notified Travelers
of the Thurston claim.  Citing the changed portions of the 1998 policy, Travelers rejected
coverage of the claim on September 17, 1999.  The Thurston suit eventually settled for
$6.1 million, $2.5 million of which was in excess of Guthrie’s primary coverage, and
which Guthrie contends Travelers should have paid.  In addition to Thurston’s lawsuit,
twenty-seven other medical malpractice claims have been since brought against Guthrie,
but these claims have yet to implicate any excess insurance coverage policy.  
Each of these Travelers policies, from 1996 to 1999, was brokered by various
entities related to Aon Corporation, a Delaware corporation.  Guthrie learned through
discovery that Aon Corporation was merely a parent holding company for specific
entities that brokered the relevant insurance policies to Guthrie.  One such entity was
Aon Risk Services, Inc. of Pennsylvania (hereinafter “ARS PA I”),1 a Pennsylvania
corporation, which sold Guthrie the 1996 and 1997 policies.  In March of 1998, ARS PA
I merged with Alexander & Alexander, Inc. to form an entity called Aon Risk Services,
    2The District Court expressly declined to consider Travelers’ challenges to the
propriety of this merger in support of its Rule 19 motion.  Likewise, we need not entertain
this issue on appeal as it was not considered by the District Court and is unnecessary to
our disposition.
    3In June of 1998, Aon Risk Services, Inc. U.S. sought to register itself in Pennsylvania
under the fictitious name of Aon Risk Services, Inc. of Pennsylvania (hereinafter “ARS
PA II”), but then canceled this name not long thereafter.
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Inc. U.S., a Maryland corporation.2  In June 1999, Aon Risk Services, Inc. U.S. changed
its name to Aon Risk Services, Inc. of Maryland (hereinafter “ARS US/MD”).  ARS
US/MD brokered the 1998 policy, which was implicated in the settlement following the
Thurston lawsuit.  In February of 1999, a new Pennsylvania corporation was formed,
Aon Risk Services, Inc. of Pennsylvania (hereinafter “ARS PA III”).3  ARS PA III sold
Guthrie the 1999 policy. 
After Travelers rejected secondary insurance coverage of the Thurston claim,
Guthrie sued under various theories seeking inter alia compensatory damages with
respect to the Thurston claim and declaratory relief ensuring that the twenty-seven other
malpractice claims would be covered by Travelers.  Guthrie filed the action in federal
court, invoking diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  The complaint named
Travelers (a Connecticut company), Aon Corporation (a Delaware company and the
parent company of the various brokerage entities), and ARS US/MD (a Maryland
company).  Travelers moved the District Court to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7) and 19, contending that a non-diverse (Pennsylvania) entity, ARS PA
III, was an indispensable party to the action.  The District Court agreed that Guthrie’s
    4Rule 19 provides in part that: 
(a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process and
whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action shall be joined as a party in the action if 
(1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already
parties, or 
(2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that
the disposition of the action in the person's absence may 
(i) as a practical matter impair or imped the person's ability to protect that interest or 
(ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring
double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest. 
If the person has not been so joined, the court shall order that the person be made a party.
If the person should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, the person may be made a
defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to
venue and joinder of that party would render the venue of the action improper, that party
shall be dismissed from the action. 
(b) Determination by the Court Whenever Joinder Not Feasible. If a person as described
in subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether
in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or
should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors
to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the
person's absence might be prejudicial to the person or those already parties; second, the
extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or
other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment
rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have
an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 19.
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complaint could not go forward without the joinder of ARS PA III, which divested the
Court of diversity jurisdiction and required dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.  Guthrie
timely appealed. 
II.
A Rule 19 inquiry is bifurcated.4  First, under Rule 19(a), a district court considers
whether a party is necessary to an action.  If a party is deemed necessary, then joinder
7must occur if feasible.  If, as here, the addition of a necessary party would divest a court
of subject matter jurisdiction, then a court must determine whether in “equity and good
conscience” the action should proceed without that party, or whether the action should be
dismissed, “the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable.”  Accordingly, a
finding of indispensability under Rule 19(b) necessitates dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
We review a district court’s determination as to Rule 19(a) de novo, while
reviewing subsidiary findings of fact under a clear error standard.  Gardiner v. V.I. Water
& Power Auth., 145 F.3d 635, 640 (3d Cir. 1998).  We review a court’s ruling under
Rule 19(b) for abuse of discretion.  Id.
A.
The District Court concluded that ARS PA III was a necessary party under Rule
19(a), holding that absent ARS PA III “complete relief [could not] be accorded among
those already parties.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1).  We agree.
The District Court held that while Guthrie sought relief with respect to the 1999
policy, it did not name the necessary party responsible for brokering that policy, ARS PA
III.  Initially, along with Travelers, Guthrie sued Aon Corporation, the parent entity
based in Delaware, but upon discovering that it was but a holding company, Guthrie
amended its complaint to “add[] the Aon corporate entity responsible for procuring the
1998 Renewal Policy,” which was ARS US/MD.  App. Br. at 10.  But the allegations and
    5Guthrie further averred that “[b]ut for AON’s conduct, Guthrie would have procured
excess layer insurance policies for the 1998 and 1999 policy period which provided
coverage for the claims at issue in this litigation and which would not have created the
gap in coverage created by the 1998 and 1999 Travelers policies.” Id. ¶ 204.  
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relief requested in Guthrie’s complaint were not limited to the 1998 policy, but indeed
referenced the 1999 policy as well.  
Guthrie argues that any mention of the 1999 policy in the complaint was just a
“factual statement” and not an allegation as such.  But even a cursory reading of the
complaint reveals specific allegations concerning the 1999 policy.  Guthrie does not just
set out facts but seeks to attach liability with respect to the brokerage of the 1999 policy. 
See Pl. Compl.¶ 128 (“[A]t no time during the 1999 renewal process did AON inform
Guthrie that the terms and conditions of the proposed 1999 Renewal Policy differed
materially from the terms and conditions of the 1997 Renewal Policy or that the 1999
Renewal Policy would create a significant gap in Guthrie’s Insurance Coverage.”)5 For
the gaps in coverage in both the 1998 and 1999 policies, Guthrie “demand[ed] that
judgment be entered against AON for compensatory damages in excess of $75,000 plus
exemplary damages, interest and attorneys’ fees, together with such relief as the Court
deems just and appropriate.”  Pl. Compl.¶ 209.  As noted above, the specific corporate
entity that brokered the 1999 policy was not ARS US/MD but ARS PA III.  We agree
with the District Court that, as the complaint predicated liability and relief on the 1999
policy, complete relief cannot be accorded without the joinder of ARS PA III as per Rule
    6Guthrie acknowledges that it has filed a Writ of Summons in state court against ARS
PA III and ARS US/MD.
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19(a)(1).
Having determined that Rule 19(a)(1) applies, we need not labor over the
remaining factors.  See Angst v. Royal Maccabees Life Insur. Co, 77 F.3d 701, 706 (3d
Cir. 1996) (“Under Rule 19(a), we need only find that the party’s absence results in any
of the problems identified in the rule.” (citing Estrella v. V & G Mgmt. Corp, 158 F.R.D.
575, 579 (D.N.J. 1994))).  Our conclusion that ARS PA III is a necessary party under
Rule 19(a) brings us to the indispensability inquiry under Rule 19(b), to which we turn
next.
B.
While not exhaustive, the four factors listed under Rule 19(b) are “the most
important considerations” in deciding whether a party is indispensable.  See Gardiner,
145 F.3d at 640–41.  The District Court focused its Rule 19(b) inquiry on the fourth
factor listed under the Rule, namely, the availability of an adequate remedy for the
plaintiff if the matter were dismissed.   The District Court observed that Guthrie has an
alternative forum in state court, a conclusion which Guthrie has not seriously contested.6 
Rather, Guthrie takes issue with the District Court’s statement that the fourth factor was 
dispositive of the Rule 19(b) inquiry.  
To support its reasoning that one Rule 19(b) factor was sufficient, the District
10
Court cited to our opinion in Angst, where we indeed reasoned that the fourth factor was
dispositive of the inquiry.  But we limited the holding in Angst to the facts of that case. 
77 F.3d at 706 (“In this case, the fourth factor listed in Rule 19(b), whether the plaintiff
will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed, is dispositive.” (emphasis
supplied)).  Ordinarily, however, the availability of a state forum cannot alone support a
finding of indispensability.  See Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Assoc v. Nilsi, 844 F.2d
1050, 1055 (3d Cir. 1988) (“surely the availability of an alternative forum cannot be the
sole basis for dismissing a suit commenced in the federal courts.” (quoting J. Moore,
Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 19.07-2[4], at 19-161 (2d ed. 1979))).   Regardless of the
fourth factor, the District Court nevertheless went on to briefly consider the three
remaining factors. 
Rule 19(b)’s first factor involves the extent to which “a judgment rendered in the
person’s absence might be prejudicial to the person or those already parties.”  Fed. R.
Civ. P. 19(b).  We have observed that this factor is closely related to the “inability to
accord complete relief” test under 19(a)(1).  Gardiner, 145 F.3d at 641 n.4 (“The first
factor under Rule 19(b) overlaps considerably with the Rule 19(a) analysis.”).  We
conclude that it would be impossible to accord complete relief with respect to Guthrie’s
claim against the 1999 policy without prejudicing ARS PA III.  
We agree with the District Court that the interest of ARS PA III was also “great”
because of the specific allegations against it in the complaint, against which ARS PA III
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if not present could not defend.  Any adverse judgment or finding as to liability could, as
Travelers suggests, be held to bind ARS PA III in another forum, if it were considered to
be in privity with the related AON entity, ARS US/MD, the named party that sold
Guthrie its 1998 policy.  See, e.g., Delaware Port Auth. v. Fraternal Order of Police, 290
F.3d 567, 572 (3d Cir. 2002).  If, based on such privity, Guthrie were to seek to preclude
ARS PA III from relitigating a judgment or related issues found in this case, it is likely
that the law of Pennsylvania would govern.  While we express no opinion here as to the
Pennsylvania courts’ understanding of privity, or predict the outcome of any privity
analysis, we note that there are some indications in the record that could arguably support
a finding of privity.  For instance, the various Aon entities share the same counsel, a
factor which, while not necessarily dispositive, is considered by some courts to be
indicative of privity. Vasquez v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 325 F.3d 665, 677 (5th Cir.
2003).  Further, despite the various corporate forms, the record indicates that the same
insurance agent, using the same office in Pennsylvania, brokered each of the relevant
policies.  These and other relevant factors might compel a court to later find an identity
of interest between ARS MD and the absent ARS PA III.  See Ammon v. McCloskey,
655 A.2d 549, 554 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1995).  Accordingly, the attendant possibility of claim or
issue preclusion further supports the conclusion that ARS PA III is likely to be
prejudiced absent its joinder.
The second and third factors listed under Rule 19(b) are closely linked and, in this
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case, also weigh in favor of finding indispensability.  The second factor involves the
extent to which a court can shape the relief awarded in such a manner as to mitigate
prejudice, and the third factor ensures that any such relief will be adequate.  As noted
above, Guthrie’s complaint sought to attach liability with respect to the brokerage of the
1999 policy; specifically Guthrie averred, and sought a ruling, that intentional or
negligent misrepresentation of the contents of the 1999 policy led to a gap in its
coverage.  For this harm, Guthrie “demand[ed] that judgment be entered against AON
for compensatory damages in excess of $75,000 plus exemplary damages, interest and
attorneys’ fees, together with such relief as the Court deems just and appropriate.”  Pl.
Compl.¶ 209.  However, in the absence of ARS PA III in this litigation, it would have
been difficult to fashion any adequate remedy with respect to the 1999 policy.
On appeal, Guthrie lamely argues that because it does not yet face any lawsuits
that have implicated the excess liability coverage in the 1999 policy, no damages have
yet accrued under that policy, and it only seeks declaratory relief regarding the broker’s
liability.  But even if the District Court is not assessing monetary damages, Guthrie has
sought other “just and appropriate” relief.  And it is plain that without the joinder of ARS
PA III, any remedy related to the brokerage of the 1999 policy, be it injunctive or
declaratory relief, would be unfair and prejudicial to ARS PA III.
III.
Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in
13
finding that ARS PA III was an indispensable party.  The order of the District Court will
be AFFIRMED.
                                   
